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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTINA R. STOKES,

:

PlaintiffAppellant,

:

Case No. 960280
(960400337)

vs.
:
MARY J. PULLEY, WENDELL
HANSEN, CAMILLE FOWLER,
JIM HANSEN and REGAN HANSEN,
DefendantsAppellees.

Oral Argument
Priority 15

:

:
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1997), as the appeal was poured over
from the Supreme Court by order dated October 29, 1996.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether a close family relationship between the property

owners in a boundary by acquiescence case creates a presumption of,
or carries greater weight as to, nonacquiescence in the artificial
boundary?
This issue was implicitly raised at trial (R. 550-551).
This is a question of law reviewed nondeferentially for
correctness. Jacobs v. Hafen. 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Carter v. Hanrath.
885 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 925
P.2d 960 (Utah 1996).

2.

Whether the district court improperly found that the

owners of the two properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in
the artificial boundary?
This issue was also raised implicitly at trial (R. 550-551)
and more generally in plaintiff-appellant7s Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 102-101).
If the previous question is answered in the negative, this
question is one of fact.

"A trial court's findings of fact are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard." Gillmor v. Cummings,
904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995); Clair W. and Gladys Judd v.
Hutchinas, 797 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 1990); Carter v. Hanrath, 885
P.2d 801, 803 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 925 P.2d
960 (Utah 1996); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, this
question is a mixed one of law and fact and is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936-939
(Utah 1994).

A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no

reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
3.

Whether the district court improperly found that the two

properties were adjoininqf and improperly concluded that boundary
by acquiescence had been established, where the two properties are
not adjoining according to legal description?
This issue was raised in plaintiff-appellant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 76) , Reply Memorandum in
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 101-100), Trial Brief
(R. 123), Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (R.
267-266), and at trial (R. 553-555).
This question is a mixed one of law and fact and is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.
932, 936-939 (Utah 1994).

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

A trial court abuses its discretion if

there "no reasonable basis for the decision."

Crookston v. Fire

Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules
whose interpretation is determinative of or of central importance
to this appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A

«

Nature

Of

The

Case,

Course

of

Proceedings.

and

Disposition Below. Plaintiff-appellant filed this action for quiet
title and trespass to real property on June 21, 1994 (R. 3-1) .
Defendants-appellees answered the complaint and counter-claimed on
August 11, 1994 (R. 23-16).

Plaintiff-appellant then filed a

motion for summary judgment on March 14, 1994 (R. 51-50), which the
district

court

eventually

Defendants-appellees

denied

subsequently

on May
filed

5,

1994

a motion

(R. 120).

for

summary

judgment on November 9, 1995 (R. 176-175), which the district court
eventually denied on January 2, 1996 (R. 276-275).
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The district court held a bench trial on March 21, 1996 (R.
323-565), and entered an Order of Judgment

(R. 316-312) and

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 311-303) on May 21,
1996,

The district court found that defendant-appellant Mary J.

Pulley had established boundary by acquiescence and ordered that
her deed be reformed to include the disputed property.
district court also found that defendants-appellants
trespassed on the property of plaintiff-appellant.

The

had not

This appeal

followed (R. 318-317).
C.

Statement Of Facts.

Plaintiff-appellant, Christina R.

Stokes ("Stokes"), owns a parcel of property in American Fork,
Utah, more particularly described as:
Beginning 16.50 chains North of the Southwest
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 18,
Township 5 South, Range 2 East of the Salt
Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50
chains East 4.00 chains; thence South 2.50
chains; thence West 4.00 chains to the place
of beginning. Area 1.0 acres.
(R. 310) ("Stokes property"). The Stokes property is identified on
the county plat map (Trial Exhibit 1) and diagram of property
(Trial

Exhibit

2) included

in the appendix

to this brief.

Defendant-appellee, Mary J. Pulley ("Pulley"), owns a parcel of
property north of the Stokes property ("Pulley property") consisting of approximately 4 acres and also identified on the map and
diagram included in the appendix to this brief.
Both properties were once part of a larger parcel of property
owned by Andrew Pulley (R. 311-310). In 1934, Andrew Pulley deeded
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the Stokes property to his son, Adolphus Pulley (R. 310) . In 1946
he deeded the remainder of his property to his daughter, Pulley (R.
241) .

The property deeded to Pulley

at that time is more

particularly described as:
Beginning at the center of Section 18,
Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian; thence West 27.15 chains; thence
North 33 1' East 12.58 chains; thence South 85
56' West 6.18 chains; thence North 4.58
chains; thence West 3.28 chains; thence North
2.50 chains; thence West 4.00 chains; thence
North 7.00 chains; thence East 25.00 chains;
thence South 6.50 chains; thence East 15.00
chains; thence South 20.00 chains to place of
beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or less.
(R. 310-3 09).

Pulley transferred away most of the property deeded

to her, but continues to own the four acres north of the Stokes
property (R. 240). According to the legal descriptions, the two
properties are separated by a strip of land owned by neither party
("description gap").
Adolphus Pulley, and after his death, his wife, Thelma Pulley,
owned the Stokes property until 1967 (R. 240) .

Sometime in the

1940's, while both properties were owned by members of the Pulley
family, trees and bushes were planted, and a fence erected, within
the Stokes property, approximately 43 feet south of its northern
boundary (R. 308) .

The area between the fence/tree line and the

northern boundary of the Stokes property is the disputed property
in this case ("disputed property").
In 1967, Thelma Pulley deeded the Stokes property to Lewis and
Carolyn Madsen (R. 240), who, in 1973, deeded the property to
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Charles and Xenna Boyer (R. 240), who, in 1979, deeded the property
to Stokes (R. 240). When she purchased her property, or sometime
thereafter, Stokes learned that her property extended beyond the
fence/tree line to include the disputed property (R. 308). Both
Stokes and defendants-appellees now claim ownership of the disputed
property (R. 17).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The finding of the district court that Pulley and Stokes'
predecessors had mutually acquiesced in the artificial boundary for
more than twenty years should be set aside.

This is because the

family relationship between the property owners between 194 6 and
1967 should have lead to the conclusion that any occupation of the
disputed property to the fence/tree line by Pulley was permissive
and not in disregard of the actual boundary line. Furthermore, the
evidence in support of the finding, consisting of testimony that
the fence/tree line had always served as the actual boundary, was
clearly outweighed by evidence that the property owners in fact
never treated the fence/tree line as a boundary.
The finding and conclusion of the district court that the two
properties have been and are adjoining should also be set aside.
This

is

because

adjoining.

the

properties

are

in

fact

separated,

not

The law requiring that they be adjoining is clear and

must be applied strictly, and there is no precedent for expanding
that requirement. Thus it was an abuse of discretion for the court

6

to conclude, based on the facts in this case, that the requirement
had been satisfied.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court should be
reversed since the above requirements for boundary by acquiescence
have not been met.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CLOSE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADJOINING PROPERTY
OWNERS SHOULD CREATE A PRESUMPTION OFf OR CARRY GREATER WEIGHT
AS TO, NONACQUIESCENCE IN THE ARTIFICIAL BOUNDARY
To establish boundary by acquiescence, "the party claiming
title by acquiescence must establish all of the required elements
to give rise to a presumption of ownership in his or her favor."
Enalert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165, 168-169 (Utah App. 1993).

The

elements are (i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line
as a boundary, (iii) for a period of at least 20 years, (iv) by
adjoining landowners.
1996).

Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah

This doctrine has always been strictly applied in Utah.

Enalert, 848 P.2d at 168; Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423
(Utah 1990).
Therefore, in order to establish boundary by acquiescence, the
owners of the properties must have mutually acquiesced in the
artificial boundary line for a period of twenty years. Jacobs, 917
P.2d at 1081 (Utah 1996).

That is, during the requisite period of

time, the property owners must have treated the artificial boundary
7

as the actual boundary. Where "neither party treated the fence as
the actual boundary, there could be no knowledge of or acquiescence
to the line as a boundary line." Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801,
805 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds. 925 P.2d 260 (Utah
1996).

Nothing prevents a party from "claim[ing] to the true

boundary, . . . where it is clear that the line as located was not
intended as a boundary. "

Brown v. Milliner, 232 P. 2d 202, 2 07

(Utah 1951).
When the owners on either side of disputed property are not
related, their activities such as caring for, or repairing the
property up to, the artificial boundary line, may naturally lead to
the conclusion that both acknowledge it as the actual boundary.
However, when the property owners are closely related, such as
parent and child, or brother and sister, such activities are likely
to be for the benefit of the other and should not imply acquiescence in the artificial boundary.
The mutual acquiescence requirement for establishing boundary
by acquiescence is similar to the adverse use requirement for
establishing
easement.

common

law

adverse

possession

or

prescriptive

Homer v. Smith, 866 P. 2d 622, 626 (Utah App. 1993)

(identifying

elements

of

prescriptive

easement).

All

three

doctrines are based on the notion that a property owner must
resolve disputes regarding ownership within a reasonable time or
relinquish her right to the disputed property.

The doctrines also

recognize that there can be no relinquishment until there has been
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some dispute needing to be resolved or misunderstanding needing to
be corrected.

Thus, there can be no adverse possession or

prescriptive easement when the occupation by the other party has
been permissive.

Similarly, there can be no boundary by ac-

quiescence when the occupation by the other party up to the
artificial boundary is permissive and it is not recognized or
treated as the actual boundary.
It is generally recognized in adverse possession and prescriptive easement cases that a family relationship between the
parties creates a presumption of permissive use, or rebuts a
presumption of adverse use, shifting the burden to the other party
to prove clear, definite, and unequivocal notice of adverse use.
2 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 202-203 (1986); see also Smith
v. Smith, 511 P. 2d 294, 300 (Id. 1973) (occupation was not hostile
since parties were brothers and sister); Watson v. Chilton, 187
S.E.2d 482, 484 (N.C. App. 1972); Tallent v. Barrett. 598 S.W.2d
602, 606 (Mo. App. 1980) (stronger evidence of adverse possession
required in the presence of a family relationship); Fehl v. Horst,
474 P. 2d 525, 527 (Or. 1970) (close family relationship requires
greater showing that possession was hostile or adverse); Metze v.
Meetze, 97 S.E.2d 514, 515 (S.C. 1957) (family relationship between
father and son-in-law rebuts presumption that encroaching hedges
was hostile to father); Mcintosh v. Chincoteaaue Volunteer Fire
Co., 260 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Va. 1979) (adverse possession of child
against parent requires clear, definite, or unequivocal notice;
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erecting fence, using privy, and picking blackberries is not
enough).
This principle appears to be recognized in Utah also.

In

Godfrey v. Munson, 597 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme
Court implied that a family relationship would prevent or rebut a
presumption of adverse possession where the parties are members of
an immediate family.

See also Rippentrop v. Pickering, 387 P.2d

94, 95 (Utah 1963) (prescriptive easement claim dismissed where
driveway had been used by adjoining property owners who for many
years were members of same family).
have

rejected

such

a

presumption,

In other cases, Utah courts
but

have

recognized

the

importance of a family relationship in determining permissive use.
See, e.g. Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993).
This principle has not yet been applied to boundary by
acquiescence cases in Utah.

However, Utah courts have recognized

that boundary by acquiescence cannot be established in situations
where "there was no room for any implication that the fence line
had been erected by adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement
between them as to the location of the boundary between them."
Brown, 232 P.2d at 207-208 (Utah 1951).

For example, mutual

acquiescence cannot be found to have occurred during a time "when
land on both sides of the fence was owned by the same person."
Brown, 232 P.2d at 207 (citing Home Owners' Loan Corporation v.
Dudley, 141 P.2d 160 (Utah 1943).
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Also, boundary by acquiescence

"cannot be established when one of the adjoining tracts of land is
part of the public domain."

Carter, 925 P.2d at 962 (Utah 1996).

A similar presumption should apply in this case, and Stokes
requests this Court to recognize that when the property on either
side of an artificial boundary is occupied by members of the same
immediate

family,

such

as

brother

and

sister,

there

is a

presumption against mutual acquiescence, which must be rebutted
with clear evidence to the contrary. In the alternative, the Court
should at least recognize that the family relationship is a factor
demanding greater weight in a determination

regarding mutual

acquiescence.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY POUND THAT PULLEY
AND THE PREDECESSOR OF STOKES MUTUALLY ACQUIESCED IN THE
ARTIFICIAL BOUNDARY PRIOR TO 1967
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, the district
court found that for at least 33 years, from 1946 to 1979, Pulley
and the owners of the Stokes property prior to Stokes "considered
and acquiesced to the fence/tree line as the boundary" between the
two properties (R. 3 09).

The evidence regarding the period from

1967 to 1979 was mainly uncontroverted.

However, with respect to

the period from 1946 to 1967, this finding is clearly erroneous.
The finding is supported by the testimony of John Pulley, Ron
Pulley, Julie James, and Wendell Hansen, all relatives of Pulley
who lived on the Pulley or Stokes property between 1946 to 1967.
They testified that the fence/tree line had always served as the
11

boundary between the Pulley and Stokes property (R. 469, 475, 488,
and 499) , that Pulley regularly mowed, watered, and planted flowers
on the disputed property (R. 470, 489), and that Andrew Pulley had
farmed the disputed property (R. 498).
However,

the

same

witnesses

provided

substantially

more

evidence that the fence/tree line was not treated as a boundary
between 1946 and 1967.

Instead, the property owners gave each

other liberal access to each other's property, almost as though
there were no division between them.
John Pulley testified that Pulley would also mow and water the
property south of the fence/tree line for her brother (R. 471-472) .
Ron Pulley testified that, while living on the Stokes property, he
sometimes mowed the lawn on both sides of the fence/tree line (R.
476), that the row of bushes had to be kept clean so "both of us
could mow on both sides (R. 479)."

His testimony also suggests

that the fence may have been built originally just to keep in
animals as opposed to establishing a boundary (R. 479).
Julie James testified that
[w]hen I was younger we h a d — w e used to play
[on the disputed property] all the time.
I
mean we had rock gardens and frog ponds, I
mean that was—all the cousins, that's what we
did, we had frog ponds and we go hunt frogs.
(R. 489).

She and other members of her family viewed the Pulley

home "just like our home.
490)."

I mean Aunt Mary is our family

(R.

According to Julie, the fence had to be repaired oc-
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casionally because "us kids would climb over and kind of mash it
down a little bit (R. 495)."
Finally, Wendell Hansen testified that when he lived on the
Stokes property he went back and forth between the properties "very
much"

(R. 499) to visit his mother in the Pulley home, and

remembered "even jumping the fence in the back and going up to see
my mother (R. 499)."
The testimonies of these witnesses clearly established that
the fence/tree line was never treated as the actual boundary
between the properties. In addition, Stokes testified that she had
a conversation with Pulley in May, 1979, in which Stokes stated
that she had learned that she owned some property north of the
fence/tree

line.

According to Stokes, Pulley

admitted that

although she had been taking care of the property, it belonged to
Stokes (R. 370), and Pulley requested permission to continue using
it for a Christmas pageant (R. 336), suggesting that Pulley never
believed the fence/tree line to be the actual boundary.

This was

uncontroverted and the district court did not specifically find
that her credibility was questionable.
Therefore, without the application of any presumption, the
finding of the district court that mutual acquiescence occurred
between 1946 and 1967 is clearly erroneous. However, as explained
above, the family relationship between the property owners at that
time should create a presumption of nonacquiescence, rebut any
presumption of mutual acquiescence, or should at least be given
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greater weight than the fact that Pulley occupied and maintained
the disputed property.

If such a presumption applies, the finding

of the district court is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.
Mutual acquiescence may have occurred at the earliest from 1967 to
1979.

This is less than twenty years and is insufficient to

establish boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, the judgment of the
district court must be reversed.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT
THE PROPERTIES WERE ADJOINING
Another requirement for boundary by acquiescence is that the
properties must be adjoining. Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P. 2d 1078, 1081
(Utah 1996).
applied.

This requirement, like the others, must be strictly

Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990).

this case, the district court has abused

In

its discretion and

misapplied the law to the facts.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "adjoining" to mean "touching
or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near to or adjacent. To
be in contact with; to abut upon." Black's Law Dictionary 712 (6th
ed. 1990).

It also defines "adjoining owners" as "persons who own

land touching the subject land."

Id.

According to the legal descriptions, the Stokes and Pulley
properties are completely separated by a strip of land owned by
neither party. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
district court found and concluded that the Pulley and Stokes
property have been and are adjoining lots (R. 307 and 305). This
14

was based on its other findings that the description gap was
unintended by Andrew Pulley, who deeded the property to Pulley, and
resulted

from a mistake

in the description

process

(R. 3 07).

Although Stokes provided another explanation for the description
gap as evidence that it was intentional, the finding of the court
that it was unintentional was adequately supported

and

is not

challenged here.
Even if unintentional, the fact remains, however, that the
properties are not adjoining according to legal description.

The

requirement that they be adjoining is clear and should be strictly
applied.

There are no cases recognizing any exception to the

requirement, let alone an exception for a mistake in description.
In its memorandum decision, the court cited Affleck v. Morgan. 364
P.2d 663 (Utah 1961) in support of its finding, but that case is
not on point and does not recognize any such exception.

The

district court had no discretion to create such an exception and
abused

its

discretion

in

finding

and

concluding

requirement had been satisfied in this circumstance.

that

the

Therefore,

for that reason, the judgment of the district court should be
reversed.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Stokes respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the decision of the district court and require the
district court to quiet title in her.
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STATEMENT REGARDING DOCKETING STATEMENT
Stokes acknowledges that she has raised in this brief issues
beyond that identified in her docketing statement of August 19,
1996.

However, the Utah Supreme Court has recently held that

failure to list all issues presented for review in the original
docketing statement does not preclude the appellant from raising
them in the brief.
City, 919 P.2d

Nelson by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake

568, 572

(Utah 1996).

This is because the

"docketing statement is for the benefit of the Court, not the
appellee."

Id.

In that case, the appellant had filed an amended docketing
statement raising the additional issues. Stokes has not done this
because there is currently no rule identifying the format or
procedure for filing an amended docketing statement.

However, if

that is a prerequisite to raising additional issues in her brief,
Stokes will follow whatever instructions this Court may give her.
DATED this

^

day of October, 1997.

HELEN H. ANDERSON, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this
October, 1997.
T. McKay Stirland, Esq.
Donald E. McCandless, Esq.
Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220
Provo, UT 84604
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APPENDIX A
County Plat Map (Trial Exhibit 1)
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APPENDIX B
Diagram of Property (Trial Exhibit 2)
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